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According to recent research, external factors and political governance 
considerations are key determinants of capital flows in Latin America.   
We postulate that corporate governance is a crucial determinant as well. 
We show that while the region is characterized by relatively low levels of 
corporate governance it shows highly volatile capital flows. The high level 
of economic volatility that characterize the region is partly due to the 
behavior of capital flows which, in turn, are influenced by external factors. 
The paper shows that by implementing better corporate governance the 
region could reduce the sensitivity of capital flows to external shocks and 
hence reduce the volatility of its economy.  
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
Following the debt crisis of the 1980s, Latin America was subject to a surge in private 
capital flows in the early 1990s.  Net private capital flowing to the seven biggest Latin 
American economies, representing about 90 percent of total net flows to the region for 
the period 1990-2001, not only quadrupled, but also exceeded official flows by five 
times.
1  The obvious question is “Why?”  In fact, to some extent, capital inflows were due 
to two factors, external developments, mainly in the United States, and the setting up of 
the Brady Bonds mechanism.   
Evidence on the importance of external factors has been provided recently.  For 
instance, Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi (1993) show that equity flows seem to be 
more sensitive to external factors than bond flows, and that bond flows are generally 
more sensitive to a country’s credit rating than equity flows. Similarly, Calvo, Leiderman 
and Reinhart (1993) show that external factors play a significant role in determining 
capital flows and real exchange rate behavior. Also, Fernández-Arias (1995) emphasizes 
the effects of international interest rates on countries’ creditworthiness as an additional, 
indirect channel that may affect capital flow behavior, as improved external conditions in 
terms of lower interest rates are transmitted both directly and indirectly to capital flow 
behavior.   
Along with external factors, the setting up of a Brady Bond exchange following 
the debt crisis was a crucial institution, which became a corporate governance enabler 
that helped smooth out asymmetric information problems between countries and private 
sector agents.  In fact, the Brady mechanism provided the political governance context 
that influenced the expected returns to investing and contributed at evening out the 
payoffs between insiders and outsiders. It helped develop to capital markets, as well as 
influencing the type of capital flows coming to the region, and it permitted the 
introduction of Latin American assets into high-risk portfolios.  This in turn made it 
profitable to invest in acquiring information about Latin American markets, thus raising 
investor interest in the region.   
The role of external factors, particularly the experience of the Brady mechanism 
and the subsequent response to it, illustrates a simple but powerful principle: well-
  5functioning markets cannot survive without well-defined rules.  In fact, the Latin 
American experience in recent years underscores a third element that should be taken into 
account when exploring the determinants of private capital flows or foreign direct 
investment flows to Latin America and elsewhere. Not only are external factors and 
political governance elements important, but also the corporate governance context.   
While foreign interest rates may affect the performance of Latin American economies 
and, while institutions such as the Brady exchange, the efficiency of the judiciary or the 
rule of law may impact those flows, a frequently overlooked element is the role of 
corporate rules that may enable capital inflows.  
The key issue is that effective corporate governance institutions improve 
information flows, allow more complete contracts, and avoid moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. Insiders will have an incentive to provide information about good 
investment projects, but also have an incentive to withhold information when investment 
projects go bad or when they have been diverting promised returns. Investors know that 
bad information is covered up and act accordingly, raising the returns required or refusing 
to invest at all.  In contrast, where information flows to outsiders are timely, accurate, and 
credible, diversions are more difficult to hide, and resources are more likely to be 
matched with promising investment projects. To ensure that resources are always being 
targeted to their most efficient uses, investors need to be able to punish insiders explicitly 
or implicitly and effective governance institutions play a role in making insiders 
accountable.  Such accountability mechanisms are enhanced when investors have clearly 
defined powers, the ability to coordinate their actions, and low-cost mechanisms for 
resolving disputes with insiders (Dyck, 2001).  
In this context, the purpose of this paper is to investigate how corporate 
governance affects the volatility of private capital flows to Latin America and how 
corporate governance elements can limit the volatility of private capital flows to 
developing countries.  Although the relationship between governance and amount and 
composition of capital flows is fairly limited, there are some existing related studies. For 
instance, Klapper and Love (2002) use a corporate governance index and provide firm-
level evidence on corporate governance practices across emerging markets. The idea of 
                                                                                                                                                              
1 Flows increased from US$14.7 billion in 1990 to US$61.7 billion at their peak in 1997. 
  6their research is to achieve a greater understanding of the environment under which 
corporate governance matters more. Their empirical tests show that better corporate 
governance is highly correlated with better operating performance and market valuation. 
They also provide evidence showing that firm-level corporate governance provisions 
matter more in countries with weak legal environments. These results suggest that well-
governed firms benefit more in bad corporate governance environments and that firms 
can partially compensate for ineffective laws and enforcement by establishing good 
corporate governance and providing credible investor protection.  On the other hand, 
Johnson, Boone, Breach et al. (2000) argue that weak corporate governance has an 
important effect on stock market decline and currency depreciation during the Asian 
crisis of 1997-1998.  These authors explain that in the presence of weak corporate 
governance, stealing by managers may increase when the expected rate return of 
investment falls.  If this is true, for a given negative shock to investors’ confidence, 
countries with poor corporate governance will experience more theft and hence larger 
capital outflows, stock market collapses, and currency crises. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of capital 
flows to Latin America in the 1990s and shows that capital flows to the region have been 
highly volatile and very sensitive to external factors by focusing on the destructive power 
of sudden stops in capital flows.  Section 3 puts the issues of political governance and 
corporate governance in context and describes various governance indicators in Latin 
America. The main finding of the section is that corporate governance in Latin America 
compares poorly with corporate governance in both industrial countries and other 
developing countries.  Section 4 provides empirical evidence on the idea that while 
external factors and political governance are important in the determination of capital 
flows in developing countries, corporate governance reduces the influence of such 
external factors on capital flows. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Recent Evolution of Capital Flows in Latin America 
 
As described above, after the debt crisis of the 1980s, Latin America was subject to a 
surge in private capital flows. Indeed, these flows, which were negligible in 1990 (on 
average 0.1 percent of GDP for the seven biggest Latin American economies, or LAC7), 
  7turned into an important feature of macroeconomic developments in the region. At their 
1997-peak, they represented on average 3.5 percent of GDP for the LAC7 region and, for 
some countries like Chile, as much as 8.7 percent of GDP in 1997.
2 
But these flows were also quite volatile. The observed surge in capital flows 
during the early 1990s was partially offset in 1995 with the emergence of the Mexican 
crisis, where the refusal of bondholders to roll over short-term government bonds created 
a liquidity crisis.  This event unveiled the fact that liquidity crises could also affect 
sovereigns.  Although in the short run several Latin American countries were stressed by 
loss of access to capital markets, increasing bond spreads, and, for countries like 
Argentina, massive withdrawals of bank deposits, this was a short-lived event.  This can 
be partly attributed to the immediate reaction of the official sector, which set up a 
significant rescue package.  Mexico recovered and financial contagion died out.  Private 
capital flows resumed in 1996, reached their peak in 1997, and remained high during 
1998.  Indeed, the East Asian crisis starting in 1997 did not substantially affect capital 
flow behavior to Latin America (Figure 1).  Although bond spreads increased by about 
200 basis points in late 1997, most of this increase was reversed by early 1998. 
What really hit the region was the Russian crisis of August 1998.  This crisis 
represents a milestone in the development of emerging capital markets. As previously 
described, the massive capital inflows that entered Latin America in the early 1990s, 
financing high growth rates and large current account deficits, came all of a sudden to a 
standstill following Russia’s partial foreign debt repudiation (Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 
2002).  It was hard to imagine how a crisis in a country with little if any financial or 
trading ties to Latin America could have such profound effects on the region. This puzzle 
seriously questioned traditional explanations for financial crises (based on current 
account and fiscal deficits) and led analysts to focus on the intrinsic behavior of capital 
markets. Thus, it was argued that prevailing rules for capital market transactions may 
have been responsible for the spread of shocks from one country to other regions (Calvo, 
1999).  The high leverage of financial intermediaries in margin operations led to a 
liquidity crunch when Russian bond prices collapsed, which in turn forced massive sales 
of emerging market assets, including Latin American paper. Interestingly, although the 
shock facing the Latin American economies came from developments at the center of 
                                                       
 
  8financial markets, it was not higher risk-free international interest rates that hit Latin 
American countries.  Still the effect of this new type of external shock was devastating 
for the region.   
Bond spreads, as measured by the EMBI+ index, displayed a dramatic increase 
following the Russian crisis.
3  On average, spreads increased by more by 660 basis points 
during 1999. Although they have decreased since then, spreads exhibit a substantial gap 
compared to pre-crisis levels, exceeding 270 basis points on average for 2002.  This gap 
was higher for 2000 and 2001 (307 basis points and 329 basis points, respectively; see 
Table 1).  Higher spreads were accompanied by a large reduction in private capital 
inflows, which almost halved between 1998 and 1999, from US$59.6bn to US$35.3bn. 
Since 1998, there has been a steady decline in these flows, reaching by 2001 lower levels 
than those observed in 1991 (Figure 1). 
A key difference with the early 1990s period is that risk-free world interest rates 
currently stand at very low levels, yet capital inflows are far from returning to the region 
as they did before.  Instead, the capital flow standstill has been quite prolonged after the 
Russian crisis.  Perhaps new information indicating that a standstill in the capital account 
can materialize for rather exogenous reasons, and generate such drastic effects on 
government sustainability,
4 may reduce the appetite for holding assets of countries that 
may be subject to big swings in the real exchange rate, and which are highly dollarized in 
their liabilities.  Several Latin American assets may have been categorized as a riskier 
asset class in investors’ portfolios, reducing their appeal to investors.  This may have 
brought the capital account to a persistent halt. 
The fact that this phenomenon stemmed from Russia’s crisis indicates that the 
capital inflow slowdown contained a large unexpected component. To the extent that the 
slowdown in capital flows was unexpected, it forced countries to engage in a drastic 
adjustment of their current account deficits to accommodate the shortage of external 
credit. Starting in the fourth quarter of 1998, the largest Latin American countries showed 
a steady decline in their current account deficits, which eventually reached a zero balance 
by the end of 2000.  This adjustment of the current account was on average equivalent to 
                                                       
3 EMBI stands for the well-known Emerging Markets Bond Index, produced by JP Morgan. 
4 This because of either debt revaluation effects or the emergence of contingent liabilities. 
  95 points of GDP for the seven largest economies of the region (Calvo, Izquierdo, and 
Talvi, 2002). 
Such drastic changes in capital flow behavior could not go unnoticed in terms of 
economic activity. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) illustrate the destructive power of sudden 
stops in capital flows, and show that when access to international capital markets is 
closed (something that occurs with distressing frequency in Latin America), the collapse 
in economic activity is dramatic.  Fernández-Arias and Panizza (2002) show that there is 
a close correlation between private net flows and growth, and discuss how the volatility 
of these net flows is associated with the high growth volatility of Latin American 
countries.  Figure 2 highlights that it is in particular non-Foreign Direct Investment flows 
that are strongly correlated with the growth process of Latin American countries.    
  In order to assess the relevance of capital flow volatility in Latin American 
emerging markets relative to other emerging and developed countries, we compared the 
size of net capital outflows and their share in financial credit to the private sector for the 
period 1990-2001.  Given that capital flow reversals are typically associated with reduced 
or no rollover of existing credit lines, the size of these reversals relative to the credit 
stock is a relevant measure in terms of stress experienced by borrowers.  This could be 
important from a corporate governance perspective, because at high stress levels it may 
be very difficult to comply with existing (non-contingent) contracts.  Given this context, 
corporate governance institutions may be key in explaining the risk involved in keeping 
or bringing additional capital to distressed economies.  
  Figure 3 shows the median percentage capital flow reversal for each country in 
the sample vis-à-vis the median of capital flow reversals as a share of private sector 
credit.  It highlights two important characteristics.
5 First, reversals in capital flows can be 
high in percentage terms both for emerging and developed economies.
6 But, second, even 
when percentage reversals are high, they are small in terms of financial depth for 
developed economies.  The opposite holds for emerging countries, particularly so for 
Latin American economies, where reversals are high both in percentage terms and as a 
share of credit. With a few exceptions, this measure of capital flow reversals as a share of 
                                                       
5 Where reversal is defined as a negative percentage change in capital flows. 
6 For example, the median percentage change for outflow periods can be high in industrialized countries 
like Canada or Switzerland, even higher than in many emerging markets. 
  10credit broadly separates countries into cases of small-size reversals, consisting mostly of 
OECD countries, from cases of larger-size reversals, mainly composed of non-OECD 
countries.  Indeed, when we rank countries from highest to lowest in terms of this 
measure, all of the seven largest Latin American countries fall within the first 40 percent 
of the sample, indicating that the effects of volatile capital flows are quite relevant in 
explaining stress in terms of access to credit.
7   
This fact points towards the relevance of corporate governance issues for Latin 
American countries.  To the extent that informational problems become more relevant 
during reversals, better corporate governance should limit the impact of external 
conditions on capital flows. Another characteristic of private capital flows that may be 
relevant from a corporate governance perspective is their composition by type of 
financing into foreign direct investment (FDI), equity liabilities, debt liabilities and other 
flows.  Figure 4 depicts the share of each type of flow into total private flows.  During the 
early 1990s debt liabilities dominated as the main source of capital flows.  This situation 
was reversed in 1995, as foreign direct investment flows became predominant, and 
remained the main source of financing from there on. Indeed, this may be a good sign in 
terms of reducing volatility, given that de-trended FDI flows in Latin America have been 
less volatile than non-FDI flows.
8 On average, foreign direct investment flows 
represented 88 percent of total private net flows to the largest seven Latin American 
countries, whereas debt liabilities represented on average about 40 percent.  By contrast, 
equity liabilities represented a relatively small share of the total all throughout the 1990-
2001 period, on average less than 20 percent.  This may indicate that investors prefer to 
have control of the assets they purchase, as is the case of foreign direct investment, or 
                                                       
7 Although the size of these reversals is large in terms of credit to the private sector, this does not 
necessarily indicate that they were caused by supply shocks. Barajas and Steiner (2002) suggest that the 
evolution of deposits is by far the dominant factor in credit slowdowns. Credit risk and regulation factors 
have also played a crucial role, indicating reduced willingness to lend.  For instance, in Colombia, where 
capital inflows were intermediated through the domestic financial system, there is a high correlation 
between capital flows and credit.  There is no systematic evidence for a large set of countries on credit 
crunches (defined as scenarios where credit demand exceeds credit supply) and Barajas and Steiner (2002) 
suggest that this was also the case in Peru. Also, Mody and Taylor (2002) find support for capital flow 
crunches in the recent experiences of Mexico and Brazil.  
8 The standard deviation of the cyclical component of an index of FDI flows (detrended by a Hodrick-
Prescott filter) is six times smaller than that of an index of de-trended non-FDI flows for the period 1970-
2001.   
  11engage in fixed-income contracts, thus avoiding becoming minor shareholders in 
investment projects, as is the case of equity flows. 
 
3. Political Governance, Corporate Governance, and Capital Flows 
 
The role of political governance on capital flows has been widely studied in recent years.  
For instance, Wheeler and Mody (1992) find no correlation between corruption and 
foreign direct investment, while Fernández-Arias and Hausmann (2001) find that the 
share of foreign direct investment as a share of total capital flows is negatively correlated 
with a set of indexes measuring rule of law and creditor rights.  Hines (1995), however, 
finds that U.S. outwards foreign direct investment is negatively correlated with the level 
of corruption in the host country; Wei (2000) finds that this finding extends to outward 
foreign direct investment for twelve OECD countries.  Wei and Wu (2001) find that, 
although corruption in the host country is bad for both bank loans and foreign direct 
investment, it is more harmful for foreign direct investment. These researchers conclude 
that high levels of corruption tend to increase the share of bank loans and reduce the 
share of foreign direct investment.   
This link, however, is only part of the story, as the role of corporate governance 
should also be taken into account. In fact, there is a close interaction between the 
institutions of political and corporate governance, as reflected in the roles of the 
legislative and the judiciary, and in the extent to which distributional cartels exert their 
power, and in the importance of monitoring.  It has been argued that it is impossible to 
move to an essentially rules-based system of governance in one area without doing so in 
the other.  In fact, it has been claimed that political governance and corporate governance 
are inseparable (Oman, 2001). 
The crucial question is how can corporate governance be linked with capital 
flows?  Johnson, Boone, Breach et al. (2000) provide a compelling rationale for why 
better corporate governance may limit the impact of external shocks.  In their model, 
managers’ benefits from stealing are inversely correlated with the rate of return of 
invested resources, and the cost of stealing is positively correlated with corporate 
governance levels.  Therefore, for a given level of corporate governance, a negative 
shock that reduces the rate of return will lead to higher stealing, and for a given shock, 
  12better corporate governance will reduce stealing. Given that foreign investors internalize 
managers’ behavior, both the magnitude of the shock and the level of corporate 
governance will affect their investment decision.  It should be pointed out that while the 
paradigm of Johnson, Boone, Breach et al. (2000) neatly applies to portfolio flows, its 
application might be extended to include foreign direct investment flows. In this latter 
case, expropriation by managers can be easily substituted with expropriation by 
politicians who, in periods of economic crisis, may have an incentive to extract more 
resources from foreign-owned firms. 
Our objective is to provide empirical evidence on the extent to which corporate 
governance plays a role in limiting how capital flows respond to external shocks.  We 
look at both flows in foreign direct investment and flows in portfolio flows, and in 
addition to the use of political governance indicators, we also employ such corporate 
governance measures.  
In empirical terms there is no single paradigm on corporate governance that works 
in all countries and all companies. Indeed, there exist many different codes of best 
practices that take into account different legislation, board structures, and business 
practices in individual countries. However, there are standards that can apply across a 
broad range of legal, political, and economic environments.  In particular, we can provide 
a basic description of corporate governance in Latin America by focusing on four key 
categories: creditor rights; shareholders rights; two indexes of procedural formalism of 
dispute resolution (check collection and tenant eviction); and accounting standards.   
Creditor rights are defined as the ability of creditors to use the legal system to 
force debtors to meet their credit commitments. Creditor rights are an important 
determinant of credit availability and are closely related with good corporate governance. 
Measuring creditor rights, however, is not a simple task because most countries have in 
place both reorganization and liquidation procedures that are used with varying frequency 
and confer different levels of protection on different types of creditors. In fact, as 
creditors do not have homogenous claims against a given debtor, provisions that favor 
some creditors may hurt others. To deal with these issues, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1999) score creditor rights in both reorganization and liquidation 
  13procedures and then add up the scores to create an aggregate index.
9  Table 2 describes 
corporate governance in various regions of the world and shows that, on average, Latin 
America countries offer little legal protection to creditors not only when compared with 
advanced countries, but also when compared with developing countries as a whole.   
While this is partly explained by the fact that most Latin American countries have a legal 
system based on French civil law (which tends to provide less protection to creditors than 
Common law or German and Scandinavian civil law), it should be pointed out that Latin 
America compares poorly even with other French civil-law countries. In this respect, La 
Porta and López-de-Silanes (1998) show that Latin American countries are less likely to 
place restrictions on going into reorganization, have no-automatic-stay policies, pay 
secured creditors first, and prevent management from remaining in office. 
Shareholder rights measure how strongly corporate law protects minority 
shareholders against expropriation of managers or dominant shareholders. This is 
important because shareholders have residual rights to the cash flows of the firm. 
Therefore the protection of their rights affects the incentives to invest in equities, and it is 
a key determinant of capital market development. In the case of small shareholders, the 
right to vote is the main source of control over the resources of the firm. Thus, voting 
rights and the rights that enhance voting mechanisms are the crucial features of small 
shareholders rights. In this context, an adequate way of building an index of shareholders 
rights (or “anti-director rights”) is to assign a positive score to all the provisions that 
make voting easier.
10  Table 2 shows that, as in the case of creditor rights, average 
shareholder rights in Latin America are well below the averages for industrial countries, 
the rest of the world, and even the developing countries as a whole. La Porta and Lopez-
                                                       
9 Specifically, creditor rights is defined as an index formed by adding 1 when (i) the country imposes 
restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (ii) secured 
creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved; 
(iii) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of 
the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (iv) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending 
the resolution of the reorganization. The resulting index thus ranges from 0 to 4. 
10 Shareholders’ rights are defined by aggregating anti-director rights measures into an index. The index is 
formed by adding 1 when: the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; 
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting; cumulative 
voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place; the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to 
call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to ten (sample median); or shareholders 
have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from 0 to 6. 
  14de-Silanes (1998) argue that this is mostly due to the fact that the legal system adopted by 
most Latin American countries is based on French civil law. They point out that, while 
the incidence of one-share-one-vote rules, cumulative voting for directors, and 
preemptive rights are not very different between Latin America and other regions, other 
crucial measures are quite different and typically more disadvantageous for civil-law 
Latin American countries. In fact, common-law countries more frequently allow 
shareholders to exercise vote by mail, which is not the case in most countries in the 
region. Similarly, no common law country blocks shares before shareholders’ meetings, 
and most of them have oppressed minority mechanisms in place, both quite uncommon in 
Latin America. 
 The Formalism index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention 
in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts. Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and 
Vishny (2002) show that high levels of procedural formalism are associated with longer 
judicial proceedings and less fairness in judicial decision. We therefore expect judicial 
formalism to be associated with poor contract enforcement and poor corporate 
governance.
11 Table 2 shows again that average formalism indexes in Latin America are 
well below the averages for industrial countries, the rest of the world, and even the 
developing countries as a whole. 
Finally, as recent developments in the United States may attest, accounting 
standards are central to corporate governance. Without reliable accounting standards, it is 
extremely difficult to assess management performance. Similarly, with poor accounting 
standards, cash flows may be very difficult to verify, and this may reduce the menu of 
financial contracts available to investors and total credit in the economy (La Porta and 
López-de-Silanes, 1998). As in the case of creditor rights and shareholder rights, Table 2 
shows that Latin America has lower accounting standards than industrial countries and 
the whole set of developing countries.
12 The poor accounting standards that characterize 
                                                       
11 In particular, we consider two specific formalism indexes eviction of tenants and check collection. They 
are calculated by adding up the following indices: (i) professionals vs. laymen, (ii) written vs. oral 
elements, (iii) legal justification, (iv) statutory regulation of evidence, (v) control of superior review, (vi) 
engagement formalities, and (vii) independent procedural actions. We rescale the index to range from 0-7, 
where a higher value indicates lower procedural formalism.  
12 Examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items creates 
the index of accounting standards. These items fall into seven categories (general information, income 
statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special items). A 
  15Latin American countries underscore and amplify the severity of the corporate 
governance problem in the region. 
 
4. Some Empirical Evidence  
 
The methodology used to estimate the impact of corporate governance on capital flows 
volatility follows Galindo and Micco (2001) and focuses on the estimation of the 
following equation: 
( ) t i t i t i i t i t i u SHOCK GOV SHOCK FLOWS , , , , * ε τ γ β α + + + + + =        (1) 
where   measures capital flows to country   in period t,   is an 
external shock to country   in period t,   is a governance indicator for country  ,   
is a country fixed effect, 
t i FLOWS , i t i SHOCK ,
i
i
i GOV i i u
τ  is a time fixed effect, and  t i, ε  is the error term. If governance 
plays a role in attenuating the effect of external shocks on capital flows, we expect β  
and γ  to have opposite signs.  We introduce country fixed effects to control for country-
specific factors that may affect the level of capital flows and use time dummies to control 
for international shocks to capital flows that are common to all countries. Therefore, time 
dummies control for the surge of capital flows in the early 1990s and the international 
financial crises of the late 1990s.
13 
In estimating Equation (1), we use annual data for up to 36 developing and 
emerging market countries for the 1990-2000 period.
14 We use two measures of capital 
flows, Foreign Direct Investments and Portfolio Flows (bonds and equities).  In both 
cases, we normalize flows by average gross domestic product. In particular, our 




FLOW , , where  i GDP  is country i’s average gross domestic 
product over the 1990-2000 period.  We use average gross domestic product rather than 
                                                                                                                                                              
minimum of three companies in each country was studied. The companies represent a cross-section of 
various industry groups where industrial companies numbered 70 percent while financial companies 
represented the remaining 30 percent. 
13 Notice that time dummies are correlated with external shock and dropping them improves the results 
discussed below. 
14 The countries in the sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
  16current gross domestic product in order to isolate changes in capital flows from changes 
in gross domestic product.
15  We also use two types of external shocks: a real shock and a 
nominal shock. The real shock is an exogenous demand shock, expressed as the weighted 
average of the real growth rates of country i’s trading partners. As weights, we use total 
export to each trading partner divided by country i’s GDP. Additionally, the nominal 





. Where  i EDEBT  is country’s i external debt 
over the 1990-2000 period and  i GDP  is country’s i average GDP over the 1990-2000 
period. As before, we use averages to isolate the effect of interest rate shocks.
16  The 
nominal shock measures the increase in external debt service due to a change in foreign 
interest rate and it is expressed as the change in the US interest rate multiplied by average 
external debt expressed as a ratio to average GDP. In fact, Fernández-Arias (1995) 
provides a rationale for why such shocks are important for capital flows. We expect a 
positive correlation between real shocks and capital flows and a negative correlation 
between nominal shocks and capital flows. As measures of political governance, we use 
the Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) indices of Rule of Law (ROL) and 
Effectiveness of the Judicial (EJ) and as measures of corporate governance we use the La 
Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indexes of Shareholder Rights (SR) 
and Creditor Rights (CR).
17 We multiply SR and CR by ROL and construct two indexes 
aimed at measuring effective shareholder rights (EFFSR) and effective creditor rights 
(EFFCR), correspondingly. We also use the Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2002) indexes of procedural formalism of dispute resolution (TEN indicates 
procedure formalism in evicting a tenant and CHECK measures procedural formalism in 
the collection of a check). Appendix 2 reports summary statistics for the data used in the 
empirical analysis. 
  We start by analyzing how real shocks affect foreign direct investment flows 
(Table 3).  As expected, we always find a positive relationship between real external 
shocks and FDI flows. This implies that positive shocks lead to more foreign direct 
                                                       
15  Our capital flow data are from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. 
16 It should be noted that weights do not add to one but to export share on GDP. Trade and GDP growth 
data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
17 Rather than the original, we use the updated version built by Galindo and Micco (2001). 
  17investment and negative shock to less FDI; in other words, FDI is procyclical and 
amplifies external demand shocks. The first two columns of the table show that countries 
with better political governance (measured by Rule of Law and Efficiency of the 
judiciary) tend to exhibit a lower correlation between real external shocks and FDI flows. 
In the case of Rule of Law, for instance, a one standard deviation increase in governance 
reduces the sensitivity of FDI flows to external shocks by more than 20 percent (column 
1) and the results for effectiveness of the judiciary are basically identical.
18 We find that 
creditor rights are even more important than political governance. The point estimates 
indicate that a one standard deviation increase in creditor rights reduces the sensitivity of 
FDI to external shocks by approximately 40 percent. At the same time, we find no impact 
of shareholder rights on the sensitivity of FDI to external shock.  This last result is not 
surprising, because with FDI foreign investors acquire part of the control of the firm and 
therefore their decision should not be affected by an index that measures the protection of 
insiders. In fact, we expected shareholder rights to be an important determinant of 
portfolio equity flows but not FDI.  
  When we include both political and corporate governance indexes in the same 
regression (columns 5 and 6), we find that in some cases (for instance column 5) they are 
not individually significant, but a Wald test shows that they are jointly significant at five 
percent.  Finally, if we interact corporate governance with political governance into an 
index of effective creditor rights, we find that such an index plays an important role in 
limiting the procyclicality of FDI flows (columns 7 and 8). Columns 9 and 10 test the 
role of procedural formalism. Again, we find that FDI to countries with lower levels of 
procedural formalism (measured by higher values of our rescaled the index) tends to have 
smaller responses to external demand shocks. We conclude that both political and 
corporate governance seem to play an important role in limiting the procyclicality of FDI 
flows to developing countries.  
Next we tested whether nominal shocks had an effect on FDI flows to developing 
countries but found no correlation between the two variables. We also found no 
correlation between real shocks and portfolio flows to developing countries.
19  However, 
                                                       
18 It should be pointed out that there are some outliers in the regression. In particular, dropping Singapore 
somewhat weakens the results discussed above. 
19 We do not report the results because they are not informative. 
  18we did find a significant correlation between portfolio flows and nominal shocks and, as 
expected, we find that increases in the US rate lead to lower portfolio flows to developing 
countries (first row of Table 4). The first four columns of Table 4 also show that better 
political or corporate governance reduces the response of portfolio flows to external 
nominal shocks. It should be pointed out, however, that the results are either insignificant 
(in the case of creditor rights) or only marginally statistically significant. As expected, we 
now find that shareholder rights are more important than creditor rights.  When we 
include both political and corporate governance indicators in the same regression 
(columns 5-8), we find that all the coefficients have the same sign but that they are rarely 
statistically significant. Again, tests on the difference between coefficients show that 
political and corporate governance are jointly significant. Columns 9-12 show that 
effective creditor rights and effective shareholder rights play a significant role in limiting 
how portfolio flows responds to external nominal shocks. This supports our previous 
finding that both political and corporate governance are important in limiting how capital 
flows to developing country respond to external factors.
20 The last two columns of the 
table, however, show that there is no significant correlation between portfolio flows and 
the interaction between nominal shocks and procedural formalism.  
Following the work of Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) many authors have 
shown the importance of external factors in determining capital flows to developing and 
emerging market countries. The purpose of this section was to test whether better 
corporate governance may play a role in limiting the impact of external factors.
21  It is fair 
to conclude that real external shocks are important determinants of foreign direct 
investment flows and external interest rate shocks are important determinants of portfolio 
flows. Furthermore, we also find evidence for the fact that better corporate governance 
reduces the sensitivity of capital flows to these external shocks. This is an important 
result because the growth experience of most developing countries is stunted by high 
levels of volatility, and the procyclicality of capital flows contributes to these high levels 
                                                       
20 It should be pointed out that the results of the regressions of Table 4 are partly affected by an important 
outlier (Hong Kong). If Hong Kong is dropped from the sample some of the coefficient become statistically 
insignificant and decrease in magnitude.  
21 While our results may not be extremely robust, it should also pointed out that we control for a host of 
factors (included in time and country dummies) that tend to be highly collinear with our variables of 
  19of volatility (Inter-American Development Bank, 1995).  The main message of this 
section is that, by improving corporate governance, developing countries can limit the 




According to recent research, external factors and political governance considerations are 
key determinants of capital flows in Latin America.  We postulate that corporate 
governance is a crucial determinant as well. In fact, in this paper we look at the 
relationship between corporate governance and private capital flows to Latin American 
countries, in particular, foreign direct investment and portfolio flows. We show that 
capital flows to Latin America tend to be very volatile and influenced by external factors. 
Additionally, while we show that the region exhibits low levels of political governance, 
we also show that there are relative and absolute low levels of corporate governance, as 
measured by indexes of creditor rights, shareholder rights, and accounting standards.  In 
this context, we pursue the idea that better corporate governance can help in limiting the 
impact of external shocks on capital flows to developing countries in general, and Latin 
America in particular. In fact, we find that real external shocks are important 
determinants of foreign direct investment flows and that external interest rate shocks are 
important determinants of portfolio flows. Furthermore, we also find evidence for the fact 
that better governance reduces the sensitivity of capital flows to these external shocks. As 
explained above, this is relevant given the fact the performance of emerging markets, 
such as Latin American countries, are typically stunted by high level of volatility and the 
procyclicality of capital flows.  Improving corporate governance can limit the 
procyclicality of capital flows and hence limit the volatility of their economies. 
While one may conclude that the results of this paper yield the simple policy 
prescription that, by improving governance, Latin American countries can limit capital 
flow volatility, things are not as easy as they seem.  There is, in fact, evidence that 
corporate governance and political governance tend to be affected by historically 
predetermined factors (like the origin of the legal code) and, hence, cannot be easily 
                                                                                                                                                              
interest and hence capture part of their effects. When we drop time dummies we obtain much stronger 
results. 
  20improved. On the more optimistic side, there is some evidence that by adopting better 
governance standards, individual firms can improve their performance even in countries 
characterized by a poor political governance environment. These findings seem to 
indicate that, in order to limit capital flows’ sensitivity to external shocks, countries in the 
region should, besides addressing political governance issues, provide incentives for 
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Figure 2. 
 
LAC-7 Business Cycle and Capital Flows

















































































































































Non FDI Capital Flows
Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela.
Source: Corresponding Central Banks  
 
Source:  IFS (IMF) and authors’ calculations. 
 
                          
  26Figure 3. 
 
Capital Flow Reversals 
Median over the period 1990-2001, Log scale






















































































  Source: IFS (IMF) and authors’ calculations. 
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FDI Equity liabilities Debt liabilities Other flows
 
Source: WEO (IMF). 
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Table 1. Difference in Bond Spreads with Minimum Pre-Crisis Levels 
      
 1999 2000 2001 2002
    
EMBI +  662 307 393 284
EMBI + w/o Argentina  771 329 273 173
 
              




Table 2. Corporate Governance Measures Around the World 
Corporate Governance  LAC  Rest of 
World 
Developing 
Countries  Industrial 
        
Rights of Creditors  1.00  2.51  2.11  1.80 
        
       
   
Rights of Shareholders  2.26  3.11  2.72  3.00 
(Anti-Director Rights) 
 
       
Accounting Standards  46.25  64.54  55.10  66.20 
              
Eviction of Tenant (rescaled) 
 





Check Collection (rescaled)  4.33  3.43  3.77  3.13 
        
                                             Source:  La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Galindo and Micco (2001); Djankov, 
              La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002). 
 
  29Table 3. Real Shocks and Foreign Direct Investment Flows 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
fdi_r fdi_r fdi_r fdi_r fdi_r fdi_r fdi_r fdi_r fdi_r fdi_r
Real Shock 1.606 3.400 2.332 0.156 3.054 3.987 1.740 1.439 3.085 1.555
(0.772)** (1.325)** (0.860)*** (0.618) (1.007)*** (1.371)*** (0.956)* (1.497) (0.886)*** (0.650)**
RSH_RL -0.185 -0.185 0.243
(0.101)* (0.135) (0.251)
RSH_EJ -0.341 -0.150 0.250
(0.139)** (0.169) (0.230)










CONST. 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.006
(0.004)* (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)*
N. OBS. 360 300 350 360 350 290 350 290 360 360
N. COUNTRIES 36 30 35 36 35 29 35 29 36 36
R2 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.32
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  






  30Table 4. Nominal Shocks and Portfolio Flows 
                              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r pp_r
IRSH
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0.007 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.012 0.012
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)**
 
(0.005)**




36 30 35 36 35 29 36 30 35 29 36 30 36 36
R2 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.02
                             
 Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 




  31Appendix 1. Description of Variables. 
 
 
  32Appendix 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Name   Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
        
FDI 360 0.021  0.028  -0.022  0.182 
Portfolio Flows  360 0.005  0.026  -0.137  0.256 
Real Shock  360 0.008  0.013  -0.025  0.074 
Nominal Shock  324 -0.001 0.008  -0.035  0.033 
Rule of Law  36  4.458  1.956  1.320  8.570 
Effectiveness of the Judicial System  30  6.741  1.803  2.500  10.000
Shareholder Rights  36  2.722  1.386  1.000  5.000 
Effectiveness Shareholder Rights  36  12.921 10.328  1.320  41.100
Creditor Rights  35  2.114  1.530  0.000  4.000 
Effectiveness Creditor Rights  35  10.344 9.216  0.000  34.280
Accounting Standards  47  60.795 13.566  24.000  83.000
Eviction of Tenant (rescaled)  36  1.800  0.975  0.000  3.77 
Check Collection (rescaled)  36  2.080  1.346  0.000  5.28 
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